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Abstract: 
 
An Equilibrium problem with an equilibrium constraint is a mathematical construct that 
can be applied to private competition in highway networks. In this paper we consider the 
problem of finding a Nash Equilibrium regarding competition in toll pricing on a network 
utilising 2 alternative algorithms. In the first algorithm, we utilise a Gauss Siedel fixed 
point approach based on the cutting constraint algorithm for toll pricing. In the second 
algorithm, we extend an existing sequential linear complementarity approach for finding 
Nash equilibrium subject to Wardrop Equilibrium constraints. Finally we consider how 
the equilibrium may change between the Nash competitive equilibrium and a collusive 
equilibrium where the two players co-operate to form the equivalent of a monopoly 
operation.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The motivation of the research in this paper stems from the observation that in recent 
years there has been increasing amount of private sector participation within areas that 
are conventionally the privy of the public purse. The driving force behind this change is 
brought about the higher efficiency of the private sector coupled with increasing public 
pressures on governments for accountability and the corresponding need to derive value 
for money from their various budgetary commitments which are ultimately funded by the 
tax paying public. 
 
In highway transportation, privately operated roads are not novel concepts [1]. However 
there has been little analysis on this topic in terms of the competition between private 
sector providers and the equilibrium outcomes, save for theoretical studies by economists 
restricted to simplified networks (e.g. [2]).  In reality, there have already been examples 
of private sector involvement in road construction and operation around the world [3]. In 
return for the private capitalists funding large amounts of initial capital investments for 
the construction of the road, they are contractually allowed to collect tolls, for some 
agreed duration from users when the road is finally opened [4]. In an era when 
government budgets are becoming increasingly tight and with traffic congestion 
becoming more of a problem in many major cities, the private sector is recognised as 
having an increasing role to play in the provision of traditional highway transportation 
investment. When the private sector is tasked with the provision of such services and in 
competition with others simultaneously doing the same, the concept of Nash equilibrium 
[5] can be used to model the equilibrium decision variables offered to the market. 
 
In this paper we consider the problem of toll and capacity optimisation in modelling the 
situation of private sector participation in the operation of transportation services. In the 
case of toll only competition, we provide two heuristics for the solution of the problem. 
One of these heuristics is then further extended to handle competition in both tolls and 
capacities. We present several examples to illustrate the performance of these heuristics. 
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In addition, we consider the effect of collusion in the setting of tolls and propose an 
intuitive structure which allows this response to be modelled.  
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Next we define in detail the problem that we 
consider in this paper along with the concept of Nash Equilibrium from [5] which serves 
as the foundation for the type of non cooperative games that we discuss. Section 3 then 
develops two heuristic algorithms for the problem. Section 4 utilises two numerical 
examples to illustrate the performance of the algorithm. In Section 5 we relax the notion 
of non-cooperative behaviour and consider if it is possible for the players to signal, 
through their selection of strategic variables, to their competitor, their intention to collude 
such that they end up in a monopolistic equilibrium. Finally in Section 6, we summarise 
our results and provide directions for further research.  
2. Problem Definition 
Our problem is to find an optimal equilibrium toll and/or link capacity for each private 
operator1 who separately controls a predefined link on the traffic network under 
consideration. We can consider this problem to be a Cournot Nash game between these 
individual operators. The equilibrium decision variables can be determined using the 
concept of Nash equilibrium [5] which we define as follows: 
 
Nash Equilibrium 
In a single shot normal form game with N players indexed by i,j∈{1,2,...,N}, each player 
can play a strategy i iu U∈  which all players are assumed to announce simultaneously. Let 
1 2( , ,..., )Nu u u u U= ∈  be the combined strategy space of all players in this game and let 
( )i uψ be some payoff or profit function to i∈{1,2,...,N} player if the combined strategy is 
played. The combined strategy tuple is a Nash Equilibrium 
1 2
* * * *( , ,..., )Nu u u u U= ∈  for the 
game if the following holds 
   
                                                 
1  As the research transcends both game theory and market structures in the context of highway 
transportation, we will use the terms “private operators” and “players” interchangeably throughout.  
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 * * * *( , ) ( , ) , , {1,2,... },i i j i i j i iu u u u u U i j N i jψ ψ≥ ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈ ≠  (1) 
 
Equation (1) states that a Nash equilibrium is attained when no player in the game has an 
incentive to deviate from his current strategy. She is therefore doing the best she can 
given what her competitors are doing [6].  
 
Problem Definition 
We now outline the problem we wish to solve as viewed by each operator with 
equilibrium conditions imposed on the users’ route choice.   
 
Define:  
A : the set of directed links in a traffic network,  
B : the set of links which have their tolls and capacities optimised,  B A⊂  
K : the set of origin destination (O-D) pairs in the network 
v : the vector of link flows [ ],av a A= ∈v   
β : the vector of link capacities [ ],a a Bβ= ∈β  
τ : the vector of link tolls [ ],a a Bτ= ∈τ  
c(v,β) : the vector of monotonically non decreasing travel costs as a function of link flows   
[ ( , )],a a ac v a Aβ= ∈c  
μ : the vector of generalized travel cost for each OD pair [ ],k k Kμ= ∈μ  
d : the continuous and monotonically decreasing demand function for each O-D pair as a 
function of the generalized travel cost between OD pair k alone, [ ],kd k K= ∈d  and 
−1D : the inverse demand function 
Ω : feasible region of flow vectors, (defined by a linear equation system of flow 
conservation constraints). 
( )iI β : the capacity investment cost function  
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If we assume that each player controls2 only a single link in the network then, following 
Yang et al [7], the optimisation problem for each player, which represents the profit for 
the operator after investment costs of capacity3  is formulated as follows: 
 
 
,
( ) ( ) ( ),Max
i i
i i i iv I i N
τ β
ψ τ θ β= − ∀ ∈τ,β τ,β  (2) 
Where iv is obtained by solving the variational inequality (see [8]-[9]) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* * * *, , 0  for ,T T−⋅ − − ⋅ − ≥ ∀ ∈1c v τ,β v v D d τ,β d d v d Ω  (3) 
 
The objective for each firm (payoff) is the difference between the toll revenue obtained 
by charging tolls on links operated by the thi player and the investment cost of capacity. 
The scalar θ  allows for an easy conversion of the investment cost of capacity via the 
investment function from money values into time.  
 
Note that the vector of link flows can only be obtained by solving the variational 
inequality given by (3). This variational inequality represents Wardrop’s user equilibrium 
condition which states that no road user on the network can unilaterally benefit by 
changing routes at the equilibrium [10].  Throughout this paper, we make the additional 
simplifying assumption that the travel cost of any link in the network is dependent only 
on flow on the link itself so that the above variational inequality in (3) can be solved by 
means of a convex optimisation problem [11].                
 
In the case when we have operators who compete only in maximising their revenues by 
charging tolls then the payoff function for each player would be the toll revenue alone 
and this is given by  
 ( ) ( ) ,i i iv i Nψ τ= ∀ ∈τ,β τ,β  (4) 
 
                                                 
2 Control is used as a short hand to imply that the firm has been awarded some franchise for operating the 
link.  
3 Costs of toll collection could easily be accounted for in the model but ignored here for simplicity. 
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together with the constraint as in (3) above.  
 
3. Two Heuristic Algorithms for EPECs 
 
The problem we have defined in the foregoing is in fact an Equilibrium Problem with 
Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC) [12]. In essence these are problems of finding 
equilibrium points when the constraints define the overall system equilibrium. The study 
of EPECs has only just recently surfaced as an important research area within a field of 
mathematics but has significant practical applications elsewhere.  
 
While algorithms with convergence proofs have been proposed recently for EPECs ([13]-
[14]), they have not been applied to problems that occur within transportation. In this 
paper, we propose two alternative heuristics for the resolution of the problem.  
 
The first algorithm is the diagonalisation algorithm which is a modified version of the 
non linear Gauss-Siedel method (as discussed in e.g. [15]-[16]). The second algorithm is 
a heuristic derived from reformulating the standard Cournot Nash game from economics 
as a complementarity problem and solving it using a sequential linear complementarity 
programming approach. Note that the diagonalisation algorithm can be used for both 
simultaneous toll and capacity selection as well as toll level selection only while the 
second approach is restricted to the toll level selection problem only.   
 
Diagonalisation Algorithm (Algorithm 1) 
 
One of the first algorithms introduced for this problem was that of decomposing the 
problem into a series of interrelated optimisation problems and subsequently solving each 
individually.  This is also known as a fixed point iteration algorithm which has also been 
referred to as the Gauss-Jacobi algorithm. In economics, Harker [17] popularised this 
algorithm for solving a Cournot Nash game. In a similar fashion, Cardell et al [18] and 
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Hobbs et al [19] have used the diagonalisation algorithm to solve EPECs arising in the 
deregulated electricity markets. 
 
The algorithm is presented as follows: 
 
DIAGONALISATION ALGORITHM  
Step 0: 
 
Set iteration counter 0k = . Select a convergence tolerance parameter, 
ε(ε>0). Choose a strategy for each player. Let the initial strategy set be 
denoted 
1 2
( , ,..., )
N
k k k ku u u u= . Set 1k k= + and go to Step 2, 
 
Step 1: 
 
For the thi  player i∈{1,2,...,N}, solve the following optimization 
problem: 
1 max ( , ) , {1, 2,... },
i i
k k
i i i ju U
u u u i j N i jψ+
∈
= ∀ ∈ ≠  
Step 2: 
 
If 1
1
N
k k
i i
i
u u ε+
=
− ≤∑  terminate, else return to Step 1. 
 
In step 1, we utilise the Cutting Constraint Algorithm (CCA) [20] to solve the 
optimisation problem for each player holding the other player’s strategic variables fixed. 
Further details regarding the CCA are provided in the appendix to this paper.  
 
The convergence proof of the Diagonalisation algorithm when applied to single level 
Nash equilibrium problems can be found in [21]- [22].   However the proofs depend on 
certain conditions that may not be satisfied in an EPEC, particularly the concavity of 
payoff functions. In fact, convergence of the algorithm relies on the concept of diagonal 
dominance of the Jacobians of the payoff functions [23]4, which intuitively implies that a 
player has more control over his payoff functions than do his competitors.  Therefore we 
propose this algorithm to be a heuristic approach for the EPEC at hand. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Theorem 4.1, p 280  
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Sequential Linear Complementarity Problem Algorithm (Algorithm 2)  
 
Since the game between the operators in this paper is akin to a Cournot Nash game, the 
second algorithm reformulates the Cournot Nash game as a complementarity problem. 
Adopting this approach, Kolstad and Matthisen [24] developed a sequential linear 
complementarity problem (SLCP) approach to solve the resulting reformulation. At each 
iteration, the main problem is linearised (using a first order Taylor expansion) at a given 
starting point. Then the sub problem is solved as a linear complementarity problem for 
which the algorithm of Lemke [25] can be applied.  As far as we are aware, this is the 
first application of the algorithm to the EPEC.  
 
To demonstrate the approach, recall that the profits of the firm i  is given by (4). The first 
order conditions of a profit maximum for each firm are therefore given by (5)-(7) as 
follows :- 
 
 0ii
i
f ψ
τ
∂
= − ≥
∂
 (5) 
 0i i
i
ψ
τ
τ
∂
=
∂
 (6) 
 0iτ ≥  (7) 
 
Note that these first order conditions define a complementarity problem (CP) as 
characterized by the system given in (8):  
 
Find  Nτ +∈ℜ given : N Nf R R+ →      such that  
 
( ) 0
( ) 0
0
T τ
≥
≥
≥
f τ
τ f
τ
 (8) 
 
If we denote the linearization of f at 0τ (some arbitrary starting vector of tolls) using the 
first order Taylor expansion, then we obtain 0 0 0 0( / ) ( ) ( )( )Lf f fτ τ τ τ τ τ= + ∇ − . Hence, 
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following [24], the resulting Linear Complementarity Problem (LCP) is to find 
jτ +∈ℜ such that  
 
0( / ) ,
0
( ) 0T
Lf q M
q M
τ τ τ
τ
τ τ
= +
≥
+ =
 (9) 
Where 0 0 0( ) ( )q f fτ τ τ= −∇  and 0( )M f τ= ∇  
In summary the proposed algorithm is as follows 
 
SEQUENTIAL LINEAR COMPLEMENTARITY PROBLEM ALGORITHM 
Step 0: Choose some starting vector of tolls 0τ . Select a 
convergence tolerance parameter, ε(ε>0),  and set 
1k k= + and go to Step 2, 
Step 1: Use finite differencing approximation to obtain ( )kf τ  
and ( )kf τ∇  
Step 2: Solve the LCP (9) to obtain 1kτ +  
Step 3: Check convergence: If maximum of 1( )kf τ ε+ < , 
terminate else set 1k k= +  and  go to Step 1 
 
Note that in order to solve the LCP, we require both the Jacobian of the profit function 
( )kf τ  for each firm in the game at iteration k and the Hessian ( M ). To do so, we solve a 
traffic assignment problem at kτ and perturb the tolls by using the method of central 
differences (forward and backward) to approximate the gradients. The underlying 
assumption here is that the derivatives exist and can be approximated in this way.  
 
Additionally, this algorithm is only applied to the situation when we consider the 
maximisation of total revenue from tolls, ignoring any competition in capacity selection. 
This stems from the fact that when both tolls and capacity are simultaneously optimised 
by competing players, the problem is no longer a complementarity problem but in fact a 
Variational Inequality and it is not possible to apply this algorithm in that case.  
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As with the diagonalisation approach, the convergence proof of this algorithm relies 
specifically on the concavity of the payoff functions of each firm [24]5. While this 
assumption is usually acceptable in modelling the classical Cournot Nash game for which 
it was developed, it may not be satisfied in a general EPEC setting. Furthermore we have 
made use of finite differencing to obtain derivatives. For these reasons, therefore, our 
proposed algorithm is to be viewed as a heuristic. In terms of implementation, to solve 
the SLCP in Step 2, we used the PATH solver [26] within MATLAB.  
4. Numerical Examples 
 
In this section, we provide two examples of how the proposed heuristics are used to solve 
for the optimal tolls and capacity. In addition, we compare the equilibrium outputs under 
the scenarios of competition, monopoly and under the objective of (second best) social 
welfare maximisation.  
 
In the case of monopoly, we assume that the there is a single private operator controlling 
the predefined links in the network. Hence this is a simpler problem that can be solved 
directly using the CCA (see Appendix A) or any derivative free direct search method 
(e.g. Hooke Jeeves direct search [27] or Nelder Mead Simplex algorithm [28]). For the 
results presented here, the CCA was utilised.  
 
In the case of social welfare maximisation, the central planner solves the following 
problem.  
 
( )
1
0
Max ( ) ( )
. .
,
0
kd
a a a
k K a A
d x c v v
s t
τ
τ τ
−
∈ ∈
−
∈Ω
≤ ≤
∑ ∑∫
v d
 (10) 
 
                                                 
5 Theorem 1, p 741 
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Where τ is the pre-specified upper bound on tolls on tolled links, [ ],a a Bτ τ= ∈ . The CCA 
algorithm can be utilised for this problem. 
 
Example 1  
 
The first example is taken from [29]. The link specific parameters and the elastic demand 
functions can be found therein. This network has 18 one way links with 6 origin 
destination pairs (1 to 5, 1 to 7, 5 to 1, 5 to 7, 7 to 1 and 7 to 5).  
 
Two separate scenarios are considered in this numerical example. In Scenario 1, Links 3 
and 4 shown as dashed lines in Figure 1 are the only links in this network that are subject 
to tolls.  In Scenario 2, Links 7 and 10 shown in an alternative style of dashed links 
represent the only links subject to tolls in the network.  Note that in all which follows we 
set the maximum allowable toll to be 1000 seconds.  
 
Figure 1: Network for Example 1 (Koh et al, 2007)  
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76 
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Table 1: Comparing Solution by Alternative Algorithms for Example 1 [29]. 
(Tolls in seconds)  
Algorithm Diagonalisation6 SLCP7 
 Toll Iterations  Iterations 
Scenario 1 Link 3 530.63 25 530.55 6 
 Link 4 505.65  505.62  
Scenario 2 Link 7 141.37 25 141.36 6 
 Link 10 138.29  138.29  
 
Table 1 shows the resulting tolls and number of iterations required for each algorithm for 
the Nash solution.  As shown the resulting tolls are almost identical and any differences 
are due to the convergence criteria used.  SLCP uses fewer iterations as it does not rely 
on a diagonalisation approach and this would suggest the algorithm is more efficient.  
 
Table 2 shows the tolls, revenues collected and the change in social welfare for each toll 
pair under (a) the competitive case, (b) the monopoly case and (c) the second-best 
welfare case where operators are assumed to co-operate to maximise social welfare. 
 
Table 2: Tolls, Revenues and Welfare Changes under Alternative Market Structure Assumptions  
(Tolls in seconds, Revenue and Welfare in seconds/hr)  
  
Competition: Revenue 
Maximisation 
Monopoly:  Revenue 
Maximisation 
Second Best Welfare 
Maximisation 
Scenario Link Toll Revenue
Welfare 
Change 
Toll Revenue
Welfare 
Change 
Toll Revenue
Welfare 
Change
1  3 530.63 461,882 87,633 1000 789,743 -4,153 510.93 449,583 87,818
  4 505.65 420,293  1000 641,860  488.13 407,301  
Total Revenue   882,175   1,431,603   856,883  
2  7 141.37 105,295 187,422 713.19 280,255 150,587 181.83 116,203 202,311
 10 138.29 100,848  709.53 266,465  179.30 110,580  
Total Revenue   206,143   546,720   226,783  
                                                 
6 Using the diagonalisation algorithm with CCA and a termination tolerance of ε  = 1e-06. 
7 Using the SLCP algorithm with a termination tolerance of ε  = 1e-06. 
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Table 2 shows that when there are no alternative routes available (as in the case of 
Scenario 1 where Links 3 and 4 are tolled), the monopolist can charge the maximum toll 
allowable.  In fact the upper bound of the toll here is a binding constraint on the revenues 
in the monopoly case.  However in the case of two competing operators, each player has 
no alternative but to succumb to the strategy charged by the other and hence ultimately 
both are only able to charge a much lower toll (50% lower than the monopolist’s toll).  
 
The overall welfare change for Scenario 1 under competition in fact approximates that of 
second best social welfare maximisation. It is also clear that as expected society as a 
whole is worse off under monopoly. 
 
The more interesting case emerges in Scenario 2 when there is an alternative link 
available for travel into destination Zone 5 which is left untolled (Link 17) in Figure 1.  
Even the monopolist controlling Links 7 and 10 together cannot charge the maximum 
allowed toll of 1000 seconds on each link to maximise his revenue. In the case of 
competition, Table 2 shows that the tolls charged and the total revenue earned are even 
lower than that under that of a central planner attempting to maximise social welfare in a 
second best case. It is an interesting observation here that the competition has the effect 
of driving tolls down below the socially optimal level.  However the change in social 
welfare is also lower under competition. 
 
INDEX OF RELATIVE WELFARE IMPROVEMENT 
 
In [30], a relative improvement measure ω was defined as the ratio of the overall welfare 
gain under second-best regulation compared to non-intervention, and the overall welfare 
gain under first-best regulation where all links are tolled at their marginal cost toll 
compared to non-intervention. For this model, the overall welfare gain under first-best 
pricing (denominator of ω ) is 460,853 seconds. The ω values for the three situations of 
competition, monopoly and welfare maximisation are as shown in Table 3.   
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Table 3: Index of Relative Welfare Improvement under alternative scenarios 
Test Pair Competition  Monopoly  Second Best Welfare 
Maximisation 
Scenario 1 0.19 -0.01 0.19 
Scenario 2 0.41 0.33 0.44 
 
This enables us to confirm that the welfare gains under second best welfare maximisation 
and under competition for both scenarios are similar.  
 
Example 2 
 
Our next example is based on a network with 4 OD pairs and 11 one way links with 
parameters taken from Yang et al [7]. In this example there are 3 players, each 
controlling a single link on the network shown in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: Network for Example 2 [7]  
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In the problem setting, players simultaneously optimise both tolls and capacity to 
maximise total profit as given by equation (2).  In particular, θ is given as 0.114 which is 
common to all players and the investment cost functions take the form 0,( )i i iI tβ β= . In 
other words, the investment cost is dependent on the free flow travel time ( 0,it ) for each 
link. The free flow times for the 3 links 9, 10 and 11 (shown as dashed lines in Figure 2) 
are 11,11 and 15 secs respectively.  
 
Full details of the link parameters and the OD (with elastic demands) can be found in [7].  
In that paper, the authors employed a heuristic based on sensitivity analysis to solve this 
problem. The comparison against monopoly and competitive situations can be found in 
[7] and are not reproduced here.  
 
For reasons mentioned above we have not been able to implement the SLCP algorithm to 
this problem. Hence only the diagonalisation method is employed for this example and 
the results are shown in Table 4 where it is compared against those reported in [7]. 
 
Table 4: Comparing Results from [7] with Diagonalisation Algorithm for Toll and Capacity Selection 
(Tolls in seconds, Capacity in pcus and Profit in secs/hr)  
 Results Reported in [7] Diagonalisation Algorithm8 
 Toll Capacity Profit Toll Capacity Profit 
Link 9 4.52 151.60 301.43 4.52 151.74 303.30 
Link 10 4.76 193.04 417.14 4.76 193.01 418.89 
Link 11 2.97 61.88 25.93 2.97 61.29 27.69 
 
We believe that our results differ slightly from Yang et al due to the numerical 
differences arising from utilising different convergence criteria used in solving the user 
equilibrium problem. However the numerical differences are reasonably insignificant and 
we can conclude that the proposed diagonalisation algorithm does provide solutions that 
are similar to those reported by Yang et al. The number of outer loops of the 
                                                 
8 Using the diagonalisation algorithm with CCA and a termination tolerance of ε  = 1e-06. 
 16
diagonalisation algorithm was 25. However, the number of iterations of the method used 
by Yang et al were not reported in their paper.  
5. Possibilities for Collusion between operators 
 
This section of the paper investigates collusion and considers whether it is possible for 
operators to receive signals from a competitor to achieve the revenues associated with 
monopoly control over their networks. In this section of the paper, our examples are 
restricted to games with two players.  To this effect, we introduce a scalar, α ( 0 1α≤ ≤ ), 
which represents the degree of cooperation between the players when they optimise their 
toll revenues for links under their control.  
 
With α , we can consider a more general form of the expression for the payoff function 
(4)  given in (11) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ), , ,i i i j jv v i j N i jψ τ α τ= + ∀ ∈ ≠τ,β τ,β τ,β  (11) 
 
(11) reduces to the familiar form of (4) when α = 0; when α= 1, the objective of each 
player is to maximise the total toll revenue of both players.  Note that he can only 
however change tolls on links under his control and continues to take the other player’s 
toll as exogneous. Thus whilst the thi player is in the process of optimising his revenue, 
he is taking into account a proportion represented by α  of the thj  player’s toll revenue. In 
doing so via the diagonalisation algorithm, he is effectively “signalling” to his competitor 
that the wishes to “collude” to maximise total revenue. It is implicitly assumed that 
players reciprocate the actions of the competitors and would do likewise. Thus the α term 
represents some intuitive level of collusion between players.   
 
Consider the network shown in Figure 1 and recall the two separate scenarios developed 
therein with Scenario 1 being toll revenue competition on links 3 and links 4 while 
Scenario 2 represented toll revenue competition on links 7 and links 10. 
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Collusion in Scenario 1  
Figure 3 shows, for the case depicted in Scenario 1, how the toll solution moves from 
Nash Solution when (α= 0) towards the monopoly solution (α= 1) as the level of 
collusion is increased. (Note that the graph flattens out beyond α= 0.8 as we have 
artificially capped the upper limit of the toll to be 1000 secs.)  In particular, when α=1, 
we obtain exactly the same solution as the monopoly operator’s toll as shown in Table 2. 
 
Figure 3: Tolls for both operators as collusion parameter (α) varies (Scenario 1)  
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Collusion in Scenario 2  
In the case of Scenario 2, where there is an additional route (Link 17) that is not subject 
to tolls, this form of implicit collusion however does not obtain the solution under 
monopoly.  In particular, consider the situation when α=1, then employing the 
diagonalisation algorithm, the equilibrium tolls obtained are as shown in Table 5.  
 
Table 5: Tolls and Profits for Scenario 2 considering collusion with α=1 
Link Toll (seconds) Revenues (seconds) 
Link 7 189.76 116,186 
Link 10 186.58 111,216 
Total Revenues  227,402 
Competitive Solution
Monopoly Solution 
 18
Figure 4 illustrates however that the above solution is in fact a local optimum of the total 
revenue function. The results reported in Table 5 are plotted together in Figure 4 where it 
is compared against the global optimum which is in fact the solution under monopoly 
(see Table 2). 
 
Figure 4: Total Revenue Surface as Tolls on Link 7 and Link 10 vary 
 
This illustrates the general difficulty with optimisation algorithms and the potential for 
local equilibrium to be located. There is also a possibility that in Scenario 2, there 
continues to be a link (17) available that is in competition with the tolled links and hence 
even under collusion, there could exist an incentive to capture that untolled traffic by 
reducing the toll charge which may result in a local solution rather than a global one. 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we have considered a problem with the focus on understanding the 
equilibrium decision variables offered by private operators competing to maximise their 
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individual profits non-cooperatively. In particular we recognised that this problem is 
effectively an Equilibrium Problem with an Equilibrium Constraint and subsequently 
proposed two heuristics for the solution of this problem. The first is an adaptation of the 
Gauss-Siedel iterative scheme integrated within an optimisation problem. The second 
algorithm that we have proposed (SLCP) results from recognising that a Cournot Nash 
game can be modelled as a complementarity problem and can be solved by sequentially 
linearising the problem and solving it as a linear complementarity problem. At present we 
have heuristically employed central differencing techniques to solve this problem, 
however it is of further research interest to study the use of advances in sensitivity 
analysis to replace the finite differencing estimation adopted here to further improve the 
algorithm. Further research would also be directed at efforts in developing new 
algorithms to solve the EPEC occurring in this situation.  
 
We have also attempted to investigate the possibility of operators colluding implicitly to 
maximise total profits instead of individual profits. To this effect, we introduced a 
collusion parameter to reflect the degree of cooperation between operators.  Implicit in 
the assumption was that operators would be willing to reciprocate the action of the other 
and we have ignored the associated issues of stability of coalitions formed.  Nevertheless, 
even for the simple examples presented in this paper, we have found the potential for 
multiple equilibria to be obtained. There is much scope to develop this work further 
considering the case of asymmetric collusion where one operator colludes more than the 
other which takes us into the area of leader-follower games such as Stackelberg with a 
subtle difference being that with partial collusion the follower may come out as the 
winner.  
 
In addition, the analysis presented in this paper can be employed to study competition 
between cities intending to introduce road pricing and/or other demand management or 
capacity enhancement measures. These serve as topics for further research which could 
build on the findings presented here.  
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Appendix: The Cutting Constraint Algorithm  
 
Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints 
 
In the case of a single operator (operator is a used here generically) who sets tolls and/or 
capacities to optimise some objective function which could be to maximise social welfare 
in the case of a local authority or to maximise profit in the case of a private firm. This 
optimisation problem is effectively an MPEC. The economic paradigm for a generic 
MPEC is based on the setting of a Stackleberg game where the leader sets his strategic 
decision variables and the road users on the network follow. In optimising his objective 
the decision maker has to take into account the responses of the road users whose route 
choice is given by Wardrop’s Equilibrium Condition. A large amount of development has 
occurred in this branch of mathematical optimisation [31] which has applications in e.g. 
mechanics, robotics and transportation analysis. The primary difficulty with the MPEC is 
that they fail to satisfy certain technical conditions (known as constraint qualifications) at 
any feasible point [32] - [33]. In recent research [29], we investigated the use of the 
cutting constraint algorithm (CCA) [20] to solve an MPEC in the context of second best 
congestion pricing and capacity optimisation. 
 
Reinterpretation of Variational Inequality Condition  
 
Let us define the 2 additional variables  
aβ : a pre-specified upper bound on capacities, [ ],a a Bβ β= ∈  
τ : a pre-specified upper bound on tolls, [ ],a a Bτ τ= ∈  
 
As we have defined in the main paper, the feasible region of flow vectors,Ω , is a linear 
equation system of flow conservation constraints  
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From convex set theory, e.g. [34]9, ( ), ∈Ωv d  can be defined as a convex combination of a 
set of extreme points.  Hence we can rewrite the equilibrium condition (3) using the 
following: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* * * *, , , , 0  for T Te e e Eτ β τ β−⋅ − − ⋅ − ≥ ∀ ∈1c v u v D d q d  
 
Where ( , )e eu q is the vector of extreme link flow and demand flow indexed by the 
superscript e, and E is the set of all extreme points of Ω . 
 
A Cutting Constraint Algorithm for the MPEC 
 
The Cutting Constraint Algorithm redefines the variational inequality using the extreme 
points as shown above. Together with the initial extreme point, generated by an initial 
shortest path problem, and the constraints defining feasible flows, the master problem is 
solved to find the optimal tolls and capacities at each iteration. Subsequently new 
extreme points (“cuts”) are found by solving a sub problem using the results for the 
current iteration. 
The CCA Algorithm is shown as follows:  
Step 0:  Initialise the problem by finding the shortest paths for each O-D pair; set l 
(iteration counter) = 0; define the aggregated link flow and demand flow 
( , )l lu q ; and include ( , )l lu q  into E . 
Step  1: Set 1l l= +  Solve the Master Problem with all extreme points in E and 
obtain the solution vector ( ), , ,τ βv d ;then set ( ), , ,l l l lτ βv d . 
Step  2: 
Solve the Sub Problem with ( ), , ,l l l lτ βv d and obtain the new extreme point 
(ul,ql); 
Step 3: Convergence Check:  
If ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1, , , , 0TTl l l l l l l l l lτ β τ β−⋅ − − ⋅ − ≥c v u v D d q d , terminate and 
                                                 
9 Theorem 2.1.6, p43 
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( ), , ,l l l lτ βv d  is the solution, otherwise include ( , )l lu q  into E  and return to 
Step 1. 
 
The Master Problem in Step 1 is defined as follows:  
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1, , ,
* * * *
min , , ,
. .
0                                            for given  and 
0                                          for given  and 
,
, , 0  for
a a
a a
T Te e
s t
a B
a B
τ β ψ τ β
τ τ ε
β β γ
τ β −
≤ ≤ ∀ ∈
≤ ≤ ∀ ∈
∈ Ω
⋅ − − ⋅ − ≥
v d
1
v d
v d
c v u v D d q d  e E∀ ∈
 
 
 
The sub problem of Step 2 is a shortest path problem which is formulated as follows:  
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
1
,
min , , , ,
. .
,
TT
s t
τ β τ β−⋅ − ⋅
∈ Ω
u q
c v u D d q
u q
  
 
Further details of our implementation of the algorithm can be found in [29]. Our 
numerical experiments indicate that for a small network tested in that paper, CCA 
obtained the global solution in a large number of test instances (as verified against a 
multi-start derivative free Hooke Jeeves [27] method). Instances where it failed could be 
resolved by modifying the variable bounds which is recognised as a common obstacle in 
applying gradient based non linear programming methods to solve MPECs.   
 
